If you concentrate exclusively on only the victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war -B.H. Liddell Hart to properly organize, resource and plan for post-conflict operations have led to a disjointed stability and reconstruction effort which has failed to capitalize upon tactical achievements. This lack of unified organization, planning and coordinated execution has led to continued challenges in maintaining security, providing essential services, and enforcing the rule of law throughout Iraq while fostering the ingredients for an insurgency. After six years in Iraq our plan to transition still lacks unified effort.
Over the past year several United States Government (USG) agencies have issued reports that underscore the need for Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) to develop a comprehensive strategy to transition operations in Iraq.
The consensus was that there was much good work being done in the field, yet the current transition strategy suffered from a lack of unity of effort and suboptimal support in several critical areas. In all, this lack of unity is not just in approach and direction by two different branches who lead these efforts, but has been perpetuated by the lack of effective and cohesive organization among the agencies and elements working to integrate security, governance development, humanitarian assistance and essential services.
This project will examine attempts by the United States Government (USG) to achieve unity of effort in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 , and how the diversity of agency approaches, organizations and resource levels impacted the ability and proficiency of DoD and DoS elements to work effectively together in the transition from combat to stability and reconstruction operations. This research will first examine USG policy and military doctrine to define "unity of effort" through an analysis of key Presidential, Department of State, Department of Defense and other government reports and documents, and to determine how the various agencies interpret requirements to cooperate with one another to achieve unity of effort. Additionally, this work will examine previous experiences in Iraq by examining the key organizational responsibilities and relationships involved in Iraq's reconstruction to include Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I), Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I), and the State Department's Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA). Finally, we will look at recommendations on how to improve unity of effort within the USG capabilities and increase proficiency to transition from combat to stability and reconstruction operations.
Defining Unity of Effort
The ability to transition effectively from combat into stability and reconstruction depends on developing effective and clear policy and strategy through a unified "whole of government approach" that originates from a common understanding of the crisis and a shared agreement towards the strategic objective. This "whole of government approach" creates the common understanding and sense of purpose that underlies "unified action." As defined in the military's Joint Publication 1, unified action is the "synchronization, coordination or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort." 2 Towards this end, effective action originates from multiple services and agencies creating an environment of cooperation within which strategic guidance and leadership must be a more effective "forcing mechanism" that ensures competing and diverse interagency interests are aligned. This is especially important when several USG agencies and organizations participating in an operation and are not under the direction of a single, unified command structure.
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The challenge inherent in achieving "unified action" in civil-military areas is found in the differing approaches favored by each actor: civil agencies are more comfortable in developing cooperative relationships, while military organizations prefer more directive authorities inherent in "unity of command." Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, when the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization requires extensive integration and willingness of efforts to achieve unified action. In all, the operational dynamic that is essential is that all share a commonly developed view of the operational environment and problem, and are committed to achieving common ends even though their methods, resources, etc may diverge significantly. Army Field Manual 3-07, "Stability Operations," calls this a "comprehensive approach". 4 The problem with relying upon an environment of cooperative willingness for effectiveness lies in the inability to direct decisions and ensure cooperation even when participants disagree. For this reason, military commands charged with stability and reconstruction operations prefer "command authority" by a single lead agency to ensure goals and objectives are nested, prioritized and synchronized across the security, humanitarian assistance, and emergency reconstruction requirements of a campaign when competing views, priorities and individual agency equities are in play. As defined in Title 10, US Code, "command authority" notes that:
… is exercised only by commanders of unified commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Command authority cannot be delegated and is the authority of the combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces, assigning tasks and designating objectives and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the mission assigned the command. 5 However, "command authority" that might be present in an interagency cooperative environment is not the command relationship described above. Instead, the more correct term would be more along the lines of exercising "directive authority." In this, a designated lead agency is given the authority to direct the objectives and required actions of the campaign through a more nuanced approach of senior personal relationship building, consensus building, and resource prioritization, all of which the lead agency is empowered to direct in order to gain needed cooperation. Many interagency organizations that participate in operations with the military operate at their own discretion, influenced by personal agendas, institutional bureaucracy, and organizational cultures; the abilities to direct compliance without continually challenging and fighting against these organizational factors is key to success. 6 Although many uniformed leaders would desire that the civilian organization and structures be made similar to military ones, reaching unity of effort and action within the interagency cannot be achieved through simply adopting military rules and requirements for command and control. Leading within the interagency control structure is "described as more of an art than science" With unity of effort, established by committed leadership, organizations work through differences, and shape decisions to achieve common goals and reach the desired end state. 15 The use of a lead agency mandated by the President provides direction and authorities needed to coordinate actions and solutions across the interagency, request and prioritize resources, and to provide oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. Although use of a lead agency does not confer "command," it charges the most appropriate and capable agency to coordinate activities, insure information dissemination and orchestrates coordination to avoid duplication of effort.
Although a lead agency does not have the authority to require action, they can effect the coordination necessary to synergize the interagency effort. Without the employment of such efforts as these, little coordination occurs at the working/operational levels, with the objectives and tasks that effect multiple efforts being husbanded and "stove-piped" within agencies with little coordination between responsible offices. In this case, coordinated planning occurs only at very senior levels and more often than not decisions are "made by committee" when groups focus on developing solutions focused more on internal politics than coordinating efforts to develop a comprehensive approach. Such internal conflicts drive the spirit of cooperation to a halt, and develop solutions that focus only on the easy or unimportant tasks in order to gain consensus and compromise. smooth transition to achieve a decisive victory. 18 Cooperation and integration occurred at the strategic level, however, because of organizational structure, personnel problems, and competing objectives between the military and civilian understanding of the problem, cooperation was sporadic at the operational and tactical level. Clear the toughest places -providing no sanctuaries to the enemy and disrupting foreign support for the insurgents.
Hold and steadily enlarge the secure areas, while integrating political and economic outreach with coalition military operations.
Finally, build truly national institutions by working with more capable provincial and local authorities. Iraqi institutions must sustain security forces, bring rule of law, visibly deliver essential services, and offer the Iraqi people hope for a better economic future. 20 In all, planning would focus on security first to clear areas from insurgent control, to hold them securely, and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions. Success could not be achieved by either military or civilian action alone -success would require integrated civil-military partnership.
However, coordinated planning in Iraq between military and civilian agencies had long been a problem. The military had nested and synchronized planning from MNF-I headquarters to BCTs along several lines of operation, with the primary focus on eliminating active threats and fostering security in order to establish conditions under which provincial control could transition back to the GOI.
The problem would be that there had been little effective planning on the civilian side for developing and establishing reasonable, sustainable governance that was capable of sustained, legitimate independent functions. In all, the gauge of success for transferring sovereignty and control of a province to GOI officials would be on the level of success by coalition and Iraqi forces in "clearing" and securing, and not upon the ability of the local Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the GOI to "hold" and "build" after security primacy was transferred. As planned by MNF-I, the decision to transfer The JCP nested goals and objectives of the strategic Joint Campaign Plan, written by MNF-I and promulgated through coordination with the US Embassy as the overall guiding plan forward in Iraq. 22 Somewhat left behind in the planning process due to a lack of manning and planning capabilities, OPA did not issue guidance or direction towards reconstruction or stability at all. 23 OPA was very concerned with being consumed by the more robust military planning efforts, and as a result resisted participating in coordinated efforts with MNC-I ; in fact, OPA tasked subordinate
Provincial Reconstruction Teams to "create their own direction" where they felt military plans were not on track. 24 On several occasions, because of no coordinated planning, reconstruction efforts between the OPA and MNC-I were actually moving in direct opposition.
This lack of unified and coordinated planning complicated problems further when the U.S. leaders in Iraq made decision to relinquish responsibility across provinces back to the GOI. The JCTSR transition directive did not allow for a gradual transition policy within provinces that gradually withdrew coalition security forces as conditions improved and governance and developmental efforts showed that they were no longer vulnerable to attack. Once a transition directive was issued by the JCTSR, a "post-transfer security agreement between MNF-I and the provincial governors" was established and coalition forces departed while PRT's remained. The negotiations for these agreements rarely if ever included members of OPA, and were mostly a military and security-based decision.
The Post-Transfer Security Agreement focused on coordination requirements with the provincial governor in the event MNF-I was needed to conduct further combat operations and mostly ignored considerations for further security for capacity building by Provincial Reconstruction Teams to ensure good unbiased governance and essential service continue, as well as efforts aimed at assisting the continued development of Iraqi Security Forces. Not surprisingly, once the transfer of responsibility went to the GOI all critical support from the coalition to PRT's for capacity building ended. 25 The cessations of support to OPA field efforts caused by abrupt vice gradual transitions severely restricted OPAs ability to continue to move freely in a worsening security environment and continue to properly conduct its reconstruction mission.
In Iraq the integrated planning effort was disjointed. The U.S. Embassy and MNF-I and their subordinate organizations did not have a common understanding of the problem. Responsibility for goals and objectives were not assigned to transition smoothly from combat to reconstruction and stability operations. Coordination with all USG agencies and the GOI to establish a mutually CIV-MIL focused transition timeline across Iraq did not occur. While OPA was looking to assist the GOI in building long-term capacity, the military was planning on a much shorter time frame for success --for establishing initially security and quick action projects that set the essential, initial conditions required to transition responsibility to Iraq and show progress within rotating units' year-long deployments. This disconnect directly impacted how the commander could use political and economic development incentives and programs to build relationships with local leaders as a key element of improving the security situation.
Regardless of who was designated as the "lead" in an area, the military commander on the ground was seen by Iraqi officials as their most influential American counterpart. Because commanders controlled funds for immediate impact and reward among the community through the Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP), the ground commander maintained the greatest amount of influence over the battle space. 29 In contrast, local PRT leaders that were designated as the lead in political and economic development were not given similar resources and lacked equal influence based on their capability to support projects and reward performance. The ground commander's overarching concern security and controlling the battle space, and consequently used their superior resources towards these ends and not long term development. 
Recommendations
The need to integrate interagency coordination below the national policy level has increased the requirement for development of an interagency doctrine. The complexity of future operational environments, globalization, and the speed at which information travels demands new ways to approach the "projection of civil -military power". 35 The separate organizations within the interagency, confronted with changing operational requirements, needs a common language to approach the complex problems they face. As the line of separation between combat and reconstruction become blurred an effective and well articulated whole of government approach is badly needed to achieve strategic success. 36 No longer can one organization, such as DoD, be expected to do it all; we must rely on our collective USG efforts to carry our tactical and operational victories to strategic success. The lessons we have learned in Iraq should not be repeated. As a minimum we should establish a Joint Interagency cooperative process that addresses four particularly noteworthy issues. First, establish a combined Joint-Interagency education system that begins early in individuals careers and continues through senior service. Secondly, develop an integrated planning relationship that unifies critical areas early in the campaign design -security, humanitarian assistance, essential services, and political development, etc. Third, establish interagency relationships that define supporting and supported authorities below the strategic or national level. Finally, structure our interagency relationship to better assist the national, provincial and local infrastructure.
Related to effective interagency unity of effort is improving interagency training and education. Much of the difficulty in overcoming interagency cultural differences, and diverse views of mission successes can be improved through developing a combined professional education system and looking for ways to train together. An integrated interagency education system will improve inter-organizational understanding between agencies and develop systems to enhance interoperability in planning, coordination and cooperation. Finally, an interagency education system should look for ways to integrate leaders at every level of leadership.
Much work has been done to integrate interagency planning processes and relationships. Planning is difficult business, and development of an interagency planning doctrine would create a framework to effectively transition from military operations to reconstruction and stability operations. The goal of the interagency planning framework is to develop the host nation to become a self reliant viable member of the international community. Therefore, this integrated planning relationship should be focused on developing a host nation through a lead, partner and support construct. Establishing a common planning doctrine will reduce duplication of effort, create a common understanding of what needs to be accomplished, and assign roles and responsibilities to critical tasks and objectives. Finally, a common planning relationship will establish transition timelines that will improve unity of effort, establish a sense of urgency, build long term capacity, and over time reduce the requirement for long term military presence.
The USG should establish interagency authorities that define recurring and / or standard supported and supporting relationships. Critical to mission success is determining who is in charge at what stages of the operation. The current use of a "lead agency" designation has not included operational authority to require cooperation below the national or strategic level. Without establishing clear authorities such as supporting and supporting relationship the interagency can not achieve improved unity of effort, especially in a lethal environment. Establishing lead agency authorities would enable partners to allocate resources more efficiently, and achieve better planning for establishing a stable environment. Relationships that define supporting and supported authorities with a clear interagency planning process would create synergy, minimize confusion at the national through local level, and establish unified approach to applying national power below the strategic level. 
Conclusions
To achieve unity of effort and create a whole of government approach to solve vital national security issues there are several challenges that must be overcome. To rely on a spirit of cooperative willingness in a complex lethal environment will not achieve the cohesive unity of effort needed for future decisive victory. When working with the interagency a forcing mechanism must be established to coordinate supporting and supported relationships. Our interagency partners must increase capabilities to lesson the need for long term military involvement in post conflict operations. NSPD 44
and DoD Directive 3000.05 are a great beginning, but do not go far enough to ensure unity of effort among separate agencies. As B.H. Liddell Hart stated clearly 'concentrating only on the tactical or military victory with no planning on how to achieve the strategic success the peace you achieve will most certainly lead to another war'. 38 As seen in Iraq unity of effort is critical to achieving victory. Without interagency unity of effort to reach our strategic objectives victory will not be achieved.
Key partners, mainly the DoS and DoD, must be strategically, operationally, and tactically aligned in structures and planning capabilities to attain synergy. Integration at the most senior levels is inadequate and more needs to be done at the operational and tactical level. Understanding relationships and establishing counterparts will be crucial to minimizing confusion in future efforts. Relationships that have real authority must be established to create supporting and supported forcing mechanisms. More must be done to effectively enable transitions from combat to reconstruction and stability operations: civilian organizations must improve their operational capabilities; while military organizations must understand that long term success depends on our ability to set the conditions to enable our civilian agencies to continue beyond combat operations.
Since 2003 our ability to plan in an interagency environment has not ostensively improved. Effective planning is crucial to achieving unity of effort, yet agencies continue to plan in isolation from one another. We do not understand each others capabilities nor do we look for ways we can integrate our efforts. Agencies outside the military do not have the personnel or capacity to do many of the tasks asked of them. Cultural differences continue to affect a shared understanding of the problem and our ability to foster a cooperative environment. Without a common agreed upon planning relationship our senior leaders will continue to give conflicting guidance and direction. Without the ability to plan in an interagency environment, with a common understanding of terms, roles and missions, we will continue to have resourcing issues, and divergence of interests resulting in longer military deployments. Additionally, the DoD is struggling, in a limited resource environment, to increase reconstruction and stability capabilities equal to those for combat operations.
The struggle to establish an interagency whole of government approach to solving national security issues will continue unless we begin to integrate our unique capabilities and harmonize our collective efforts below the strategic level. Many of the obstacles obstructing civilian and military cooperation are too complex to rely on cooperative willingness to solve. Agencies have deeply ingrained organizational cultures and differences that will continue to prevent unity of effort, especially in a lethal environment, and will not simply go away as we further integrate operations to the
